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policies: convergence and divergence
Patrick K€ollner
GIGA Institute of Asian Studies, GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies and
University of Hamburg, Hamburg, Germany
ABSTRACT
Australia and New Zealand (NZ) have in recent years been at the forefront of
the growing confrontation between the ‘West’ and China. Despite very close
economic ties with China, both countries have substantially changed their
approaches to dealing with the People’s Republic. In this article, I take stock
of and compare the Australian and NZ recalibrations of their respective China
policies, highlighting similarities as well as differences across the two country
contexts and over time. It was Australian federal state actors who first
embarked on a major ‘reset’ of China policy, culminating in legislation on
espionage and foreign interference in 2018. After a change in government,
state authorities in NZ appeared to follow Australia’s lead. However, NZ’s
adjustment of its China policy has been less straightforward, more contested
and overall more ambiguous. Small-state theories partly explain NZ’s more
ambivalent approach. A more comprehensive understanding can be gained
by reference to how NZ differs from its Tasman neighbour in terms of stra-
tegic outlook, including the paramount importance accorded to trade in its
foreign affairs.
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Introduction
In recent years, a number of states and regional actors have substantially
adjusted their approaches to dealing with the People’s Republic of China
(PRC). While these policy shifts all entail idiosyncratic domestic drivers and
dynamics, they do also reflect changes occurring in the PRC—which has,
under Xi Jinping, become more assertive in its foreign policy and also more
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ideologically orthodox and repressive domestically. Much attention has
focused on the confrontational stance of the Trump administration—which is
not surprising, given that great power rivalry matters tremendously for global
affairs and can have important consequences for state and other actors
caught in the middle. This holds especially true for countries in the Western
rim of the Pacific, where US–China strategic rivalry is particularly pronounced.
Substantive China policy shifts have already taken place in Australasia.
Australia saw through a major reset of its China-related policies in 2017 and
2018. More recently, Australia’s neighbour New Zealand (NZ) also adjusted its
China policy. As Richard McGregor notes, the two Australasian allies make for
‘unlikely combatants. Both economies are heavily trade-dependent, have
long looked to Asia to do business, and have enjoyed a boom in commercial
ties with China over the past two decades’ (2019, p. 1).
In this article, I take stock of and compare the Australian and NZ recalibra-
tions of their respective China policies, highlighting significant similarities and
differences across the two country contexts and over time. I show how it was
Australian federal state actors who first embarked on a major ‘reset’ of China
policy, culminating in legislation on foreign interference in 2018. After a
change in government in late 2017, state authorities in NZ appeared to follow
suit. However, NZ’s adjustment of its China policy has been less straightfor-
ward, more contested and overall more ambiguous. I thus ask why NZ’s recent
China policy shift has differed from Australia’s despite the close ties that bind
them. Why, in other words, did NZ not fully follow Australia’s lead? I argue
that small-state theories help to explain NZ’s more ambivalent approach.
The article is structured as follows. In the first section, I show how Australia and
NZ are similar and closely connected to each other. I also highlight the striking
similarities and slight, but relevant, differences between the two Australasian
states in terms of their respective relationshipswith the PRC. In the second section,
I identify key differences that set NZ apart from its Tasman neighbour and that I
expect to impact on its approach to dealingwith China: first, size and international
status; second, strategic outlook. In the third section, I take stock of Australia’s
reset of China policy. In the fourth section, I show how NZ’s long-standing
approach of embracing China changed substantially in 2018—only to be modi-
fied again soon thereafter. In the final section, I compare Australia’s and NZ’s
approaches to dealingwith China and discuss the reasons why they have not fully
converged. I end by offering suggestions for further research.
Australia and NZ: commonalities and differences
The ties that bind together the two Australasian countries
Despite their physical distance from the United States and Europe, Australia
and NZ have long been considered members of the ‘West’. Both countries
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are long-standing parliamentary democracies with robust democratic cul-
tures. They share Anglo-Celtic settler roots, a common past as dominions of
the British Empire, and the same monarch. Both Australia and NZ are pre-
dominantly free trade-oriented, and have strong primary sectors. The two
countries are closely integrated economically, sharing what is de facto a
common market for goods and services. Australian and NZ citizens are
allowed to reside and work, with some restrictions, in the other country.
There is thus a constant flow of people, goods, services and ideas across
the Tasman Sea. Cultural interchange runs deep. Australia has long been
NZ’s most important economic partner, while NZ features among Australia’s
key economic partners. As Hugh White, the doyen of strategic studies in
Australia, argues, ‘no two countries have more in common with each other
than we have with New Zealand’ (quoted in Harman, 2019e).
The close ties between Australia and NZ include security and intelligence
cooperation too. The ANZUS treaty commits the two countries to mutual
defence in case of outside aggression. Whereas the US–NZ link in that
treaty collapsed in the 1980s due to the latter’s non-nuclear policy, intelli-
gence-sharing among the three countries continued. Along with the United
Kingdom and Canada, they form the ‘Five Eyes’, the exclusive Anglophone
intelligence-sharing club going back to 1946. An important part of what is
shared signals intelligence. The Five Eyes members operate an array of elec-
tronic eavesdropping posts in their respective countries (Buchanan, 2010,
pp. 268–269). Regular exchanges at the level of officials as well as high-level
exchanges take place among the five partners. There is also a consular,
police and customs side to Five Eyes (Author interview, 2019j).
… and them to China
For both the Australian and the NZ economy, China has come to assume
an extremely prominent role. At the core of this is trade in goods and serv-
ices. Reflecting the strong primary sectors of the two economies, ores and
coal in the Australian case and dairy, other agricultural as well as forestry
products in the NZ one figure prominently in their exports to China—
which, in turn, mainly exports manufactured goods to them. Whereas both
Australia and NZ are attractive trade partners for China, their relative
importance varies not only in terms of trade volumes but also of the main
products it imports. Arguably, Australia’s exports of minerals are of greater
strategic value to China and might be harder to replace than NZ’s more
elastic exports. Paul Buchanan (2018) suggests that this makes NZ particu-
larly vulnerable to potential Chinese economic coercion. However, such
claims are difficult to ascertain given the lack of thorough analyses of NZ’s
and Australia’s economic dependence on China.
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Australia and NZ have each signed free trade agreements (FTAs) and
broader strategic partnership agreements with the PRC. For both, China is
now the number-one trading partner. Goods and services combined, China
trade accounts for around one-quarter of total trade for Australia, and one-
fifth for NZ. Important revenue streams in the two countries’ service sectors
are provided by Chinese tourists and students—whose numbers have
grown substantially in recent years. China (including Hong Kong) has also
emerged as a significant source of foreign direct investment (FDI) in
Australia, and even more so in NZ. Economic links with China have helped
Australia and NZ to better weather the global financial crisis and to buttress
their solid economic growth rates in recent years. However, their bilateral
economic relationships are also of an altogether simpler kind than China’s
economic links with, say, the US—where questions of intellectual property
rights and technological leadership loom large (K€ollner, 2018, pp. 2–3, 2019,
pp. 2–3; McGregor, 2019, p. 1).
In structural terms, Australia’s and NZ’s relationships with China are
asymmetric. Brantly Womack defines such relationships as ones ‘in which
the smaller side is significantly more exposed to interactions than the larger
side because of the disparity of capabilities, and yet the larger is not able to
dictate unilaterally the terms of the relationship’ (2016, p. 10). The disparity
in terms of power capabilities is much larger in the NZ–China than the
Australia–China relationship, which should lead to a greater sense of vulner-
ability and the even greater importance of relationship management.
How NZ differs from Australia
NZ differs from its Tasman neighbour in terms of size and position in the
international system, as well as in terms of strategic outlook.
Size and position in the international system
In comparison with Australia, NZ’s much smaller population, economy and
defence spending explain why the first is widely seen as a middle power
and the latter as a small one in the international system.1 The literature on
small states (or small powers—the two terms are used synonymously here)
and their foreign policies is based on the premise that size matters in inter-
national relations. As Baldur Thorhallsson and Sverrir Steinsson note, ‘small
states have different needs, adopt different foreign policies, and have a
harder time achieving favorable foreign policy outcomes than large states’
(2017, abstract), due to small states’ more limited resources as well as cap-
acity, and their greater vulnerability.
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Owing to their small population and economies, small states have less
aggregate structural power in terms of resources and capabilities, and they
tend to be weak militarily (Thorhallsson & Steinsson, 2017, p. 4). Despite
these constraints, there is considerable room for manoeuvre and strategic
positioning. Small powers can, and empirically do, pursue different security
strategies, ranging from alliances with great powers to unarmed neutrality.
In their dealings with great powers, small powers have to be prudent. With
reference to their asymmetric relationships with China, Reuben Steff sug-
gests that ‘small states, dependent on maintaining high levels of trade with
China to secure their prosperity, are loathe to criticise or take actions that
Beijing could find objectionable. This is creating a dilemma over how small
states can protect their national interests at a time when China’s growing
influence threatens the status quo’ (2018).
Smallness can have its advantages too. Thorhallsson and Steinsson note
that small states’ ‘informality, flexibility, and the autonomy of their diplo-
mats can prove advantageous in negotiations and within institutional set-
tings’ (2017, p. 2). Rapid decision-making owing to the smallness and
intimacy of bureaucratic and political actors can be another benefit. In a
similar vein, Peter Katzenstein notes that small size favours debate and
learning. He argues that small states’ ‘economic openness and international
vulnerability mean control over fewer resources and the probability of
greater loss. Hence the environmental conditions in which small states
operate are particularly conducive for high learning’ (Katzenstein, 2003, p.
16). Whether such learning occurs is not predetermined but, as Katzenstein
suggests, small states’ greater openness and vulnerability ‘leads to a con-
tested political space which [in turn] creates the opportunity for domestic
actors to learn and adapt’ (2003, p. 18).
Strategic outlook
Robert Ayson argues that it is ‘nearly as tempting to exaggerate the differ-
ences in the strategic outlooks of Australia and NZ as is to emphasize the
similarities’ (2012, p. 360). The close ties that bind the two countries
together help explain their many similarities. But, there are also major dif-
ferences. NZ’s smaller size affects the country’s strategic outlook. Smallness
is a constant theme in foreign policy statements and speeches of NZ policy-
makers. Also, and despite the two countries’ relative closeness, their geo-
graphic location differs. Whereas Australia borders both the Pacific and the
Indian Oceans and adjoins Southeast Asia, NZ’s only real neighbour is
Australia which, with its continental size, provides a kind of natural shelter.
To the north, NZ borders the South Pacific with its scattered islands where
a significant part of its population hails from. While both countries have in
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the past championed multilateral initiatives in Asia-Pacific, their different
geographical positions help to explain why Australian governments have in
recent years promoted the idea of the Indo-Pacific as one unified geostra-
tegic area whereas NZ has retained a stronger focus on the South Pacific.
Though a small power on the global stage, NZ is a regional power in that
world region—whereas Australia is a regional power in both the South
Pacific and the larger Indo-Pacific.
NZ’s strategic outlooks also differ from Australia’s because their ties
with the US are not the same. Whereas political elites in both countries
believe that America should remain strongly engaged in Asia, such
engagement is more vital to Australia—whose security policy hinges on
its alliance with the US. NZ, on the other hand, ceased to be a formal
ally of the US in the mid-1980s already. Wellington’s desire for greater
foreign policy autonomy led to a rupture in this alliance (Catalinac, 2010).
This rupture provided greater credibility to the idea of an ‘independent
foreign policy’ that successive NZ governments have subscribed to since
Norman Kirk’s premiership in the early 1970s. NZ’s contributions to US
counterterrorism campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq helped to warm bilat-
eral relations again in the early years of the twenty-first century.
Testament to this is the 2010 Wellington Declaration, which renewed the
strategic partnership between the US and NZ. The subsequent
Washington Declaration provided a framework for closer bilateral defence
cooperation meanwhile. Still, close security cooperation with the US does
not make NZ a formal ally thereof. Moreover, despite its closer security
ties with the US, NZ has remained cautious about being seen as party to
US positions on Asia-Pacific/Indo-Pacific security (Ayson, 2016, p. 504).
Politically—and especially in the security domain—Australia remains thus
much more aligned with the US than NZ is.
Finally, NZ’s strategic outlook is shaped by a very strong trade impera-
tive. Whereas both the Australian and NZ governments see trade promotion
as an integral part of foreign policy and have sought to compartmentalise
security and trade matters (Ayson, 2012, p. 356), trade policy is of overall
greater importance for NZ. Thorhallsson and Steinsson (2017, pp. 2, 6) note
that such countries can try to make up for their small aggregate power by
prioritising a few issues that are especially important to them. If sufficient
time, effort and resources are invested, small states can increase their issue-
specific power. NZ’s focus on trade policy is a case in point. NZ’s small
domestic market makes the country reliant on foreign trade for its eco-
nomic prosperity, and more vulnerable to international economic fluctua-
tions. To maximise benefits and influence, successive NZ governments have
devoted particular diplomatic efforts and talented personnel to pursuing
FTAs and to filling important positions in relevant regional and international
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organisations. In fact, trade has been a policy area in which NZ has man-
aged to punch above its weight in international relations in recent decades.
Trade has effectively topped other NZ foreign policy concerns for some
time. David Craw argues that NZ’s ‘most important national interest is the
protection and expansion of the country’s export trade, and that all govern-
ments are subject to this imperative’ (2005, p. 230). Former prime minister
Robert Muldoon’s 1980 dictum that ‘our foreign policy is trade’ has rung
true for many NZ governments, especially those run or led by the National
Party (McCraw, 1994, pp. 14–15). As Buchanan emphasises, ‘virtually all of
[New Zealand’s] foreign policy perspective passes first through the prism of
trade, because [of the belief that] without a vigorous import–export orien-
tation, the NZ economy would stagnate and die’ (2010, p. 265).
Australia resets its China policy
Their respective security ties to the US and strong economic ones to China
put Australia and NZ in a potentially difficult spot, one which could turn
into a real dilemma should they be forced to choose sides. Having to
choose between the US and China or between their security and economic
interests is something that governments in both countries would like to
avoid (Young, 2017a, p. 515). However, as Ayson suggested some years
ago, ‘[b]y dint of its less intense strategic relationship with Washington, and
its smaller size, [NZ may well have a] greater chance than Australia of stay-
ing away from this sort of zero-sum game’ (2012, p. 353). Certainly, the
Tasman neighbours’ approaches to dealing with this potential dilemma
have diverged. As Jason Young notes, NZ has for many years ‘engaged
China in a proactive and pragmatic manner’ whereas Australia has tended
to emphasise security concerns and been ‘more openly critical of Chinese
governance, human rights, and foreign policy’ (2017a, p. 515). Australia’s
greater propensity to openly criticise China was also on display in what
John Garnaut (2018) calls the reset of China policy.2 That reset had internal
and external dimensions, and led China to freeze bilateral high-level polit-
ical exchange. The Global Times, China’s international newspaper and
propaganda organ known for its blunt language, said in May 2018 that
‘Australia’s relations with China are among the worst of all Western nations’
(Global Times, 2018). How did things get that bad?
External dimensions of the reset
Especially after 2016, unease had grown in Australia about China’s increas-
ing assertiveness in the South China Sea (SCS). The decision by the Chinese
government not to accept the July 2016 ruling of a tribunal constituted
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under Annex VII to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
shattered any remaining hopes for a rules-based solution to territorial dis-
putes in the SCS. The Chinese rejection of the ruling—which stated, among
other things, that the country had ‘no historical rights’ based on the so-
called nine-dash line to territory also claimed by other states (Permanent
Court of Arbitration, 2016, p. 2)—did not come as a surprise. But the rejec-
tion of the ruling, combined with China’s fortification of islands and other
territories, made it plain that security risks in the area were on the rise.
Australian cabinet members publicly adopted an increasingly critical
tone towards China in 2017. Speaking at a public forum in Singapore in
March, then foreign minister Julie Bishop (2017) made a thinly veiled jab at
the PRC, expressing concern about rising powers’ use of ‘newfound
strength to challenge existing territorial or strategic boundaries or to
impose their political will on others.’ At the Shangri-La security dialogue a
few months later, then PM Malcolm Turnbull (2015–2018) was even more
direct, noting fears that China would ‘seek to impose a latter day Monroe
Doctrine on this hemisphere in order to dominate the region’ and urging
the PRC to respect ‘the sovereignty of others’ (Turnbull, 2017a). Turnbull’s
speech followed up on the government’s 2016 Defence White Paper, and
set the tone for the 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper. Both documents high-
light growing security risks in the Indo-Pacific, with the Foreign Policy
White Paper expressing concern about the ‘unprecedented pace and scale’
of China’s activities in the SCS (Australian Government, 2017, p. 47). The
document emphasised the need for a strong US presence in the region,
and called for greater security cooperation with other nations in the Indo-
Pacific. Both white papers point to the need for closer engagement by the
Australian Defence Force (ADF) in the region. The ADF will in fact grow to
62,000 and see very substantial investments in military hardware over the
next few decades—including the procurement of new submarines, naval
frigates and fighter jets (Grigg & Tillett, 2018; Tarabay, 2019).
Another concern of policymakers in Canberra has been China’s growing
presence in the South Pacific, a region often considered Australia’s ‘sphere
of influence’ (White, 2019). Through its expanding diplomatic, trade and
investment in, as well as growing aid to, the region, China is seen to be
challenging Australia’s own position there. Strategic circles in Canberra
worry that Chinese loans to South Pacific nations will ultimately lead to pol-
itical dependency on the part of the latter. They also fear that China’s
apparent interest in port development in the region, might be motivated
by an aspiration to set up a military base in that part of the Pacific.
Whether such concerns are ultimately well founded or not, Australia
decided in 2018 to join forces with the US in developing a naval base in
PNG—apparently trying to pre-empt Chinese moves (BBC, 2018). Australian
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government representatives also imparted upon regional leaders the risks
of accepting large loans from China. Moreover, they pushed for more inten-
sive security-related cooperation among Pacific Islands Forum member
states (which include Australia and NZ), culminating in the September 2018
Boe Declaration on Regional Security.
The Australian government committed itself in the 2017 Foreign Policy
White Paper and subsequent announcements by PM Scott Morrison—for
whom Australia’s ‘step-up’ of engagement in the South Pacific has become
a signature foreign policy initiative—to further increasing economic assist-
ance to the region, and to establishing new diplomatic missions there
(DFAT, n.d.). In the 12months after assuming office in August 2018, both
Morrison and FM Marise Payne visited the region several times, underlining
that the government was serious about increased engagement. In 2018, the
government also established the Australian Infrastructure Financing Facility
to provide an alternative funding source for infrastructure projects in the
region. It also agreed to build at a cost of around 200 million Australian dol-
lars an underwater Internet cable network between Papua New Guinea, the
Solomon Islands and Australia. The cable was originally supposed to be
installed by Huawei. Security concerns led to the Australian government’s
decision to seek an alternative (Wyeth, 2019). While there is some debate
about the effectiveness of the step-up and the measures connected to it,
Australia’s increased engagement in the South Pacific constitutes a genuine
attempt to balance China’s increased presence in the region (White, 2019).
Internal dimensions of the reset
As Rory Medcalf notes, Australia has been a ‘first mover in pushing back
against Chinese interference [in domestic politics]’ (2019, p. 109). Concerns
about China’s increasingly assertive foreign policy as well as repression at
home became more apparent in Australian politics in 2017, when the fed-
eral parliament blocked a bilateral extradition treaty and a memorandum of
understanding concerning Australia’s participation in the Belt and Road
Initiative (BRI), China’s signature foreign policy and connectivity project.
Already in 2016, the federal government had blocked the sale of a large
electricity supplier to a Chinese-led consortium, prefiguring later discussions
about the risks of ‘critical infrastructure’ being foreign-owned. In the same
year, the government commissioned a classified report on foreign interfer-
ence (Medcalf, 2019, p. 119). Foreign interference became a hot topic in
mid-2017. In June, an investigative report by the Australian Broadcasting
Corporation cast light on Chinese influence over Australia’s domestic polit-
ics. It accused the government in Beijing of organising Chinese students in
Australia to demonstrate on behalf of Chinese state interests, and of setting
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up spy networks within these student communities. The report also
revealed opaque political donations from Chinese and Australian-Chinese
businessmen to Australian policymakers. Other large-scale donations had
been channelled to universities and think tanks (ABC, 2017). Speculation
was rife that these donations were at least in part undertaken to obtain
access and influence. It also became known that Chinese corporations had
offered lucrative jobs to former Australian policymakers.
Of particular concern to Australian policymakers and the intelligence
community have been the covert activities of the United Front Work
Department (UFWD) of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The UFWD’s
tasks include political-influence activities abroad. According to Anne-Marie
Brady, the UFWD has focused under Xi on, among other things,
‘strengthening efforts to manage and guide overseas Chinese communities
and utilize them as agents of Chinese foreign policy’ and on re-emphasising
‘people-to-people, party-to-party, plus PRC enterprise-to-foreign enterprise
relations, with the aim of coopting foreigners to support and promote the
CCP’s foreign policy goals’ (2017, p. 7).
Both Australia and NZ have figured as prominent targets of UFWD
efforts, as well as of other attempts at influencing political and public dis-
course in China’s favour (see Brady, 2017; Fitzgerald, 2018). In both coun-
tries, fundraising is a vital issue for party leaders and aspiring politicians
alike, providing possible entry points for political access and influence-
seeking activities by foreign actors. One of the biggest political scandals in
Australia in 2017 saw the fall and eventual resignation of Labor Party sen-
ator Sam Dastyari, who had advocated accepting Chinese territorial claims
in the SCS. He was later found to have accepted substantial donations from
a Chinese billionaire real-estate magnate living in Australia (until his resi-
dency permit was eventually revoked in early 2019) (Smith, 2019).
The welter of media and academic reporting on Chinese influence-seeking
activities, coupled with repeated warnings from Australia’s intelligence agen-
cies and culminating in the Dastyari affair, prompted the federal government
to introduce in December 2017 counter-interference legislation. In his speech
introducing the relevant bill, PM Turnbull upped the ante, emphasising that
Australia needed to ‘clearly set the terms of healthy and sustainable engage-
ment’ with China and adding that ‘the Australian people stand up and assert
their sovereignty in our nation, with our parliament and with our laws’
(2017b). The Chinese government immediately lodged a formal complaint
against the allegations of interference, saying that Turnbull’s remarks
‘poison[ed] the atmosphere of the China-Australia relationship and under-
mine[d] the foundation of mutual trust and bilateral cooperation’ (Knaus &
Phillips, 2017). In June 2018, the National Security Legislation Amendment
(Espionage and Foreign Interference) Act passed with bipartisan support in
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both houses of the federal parliament. The act amended the criminal code
and various forms of government legislation. It strengthened existing penal-
ties for espionage and related offences. It also defined foreign interference
and stipulated harsh penalties for related offenses. The related Foreign
Influence Transparency Scheme Act requires foreign lobbyists to register with
the authorities, and provides for greater transparency concerning political
donations (Australian Government, 2018b, 2018c).
Already in March 2018, both houses had passed the Security of Critical
Infrastructure Act 2018. This act served to establish a (confidential) register
of critical infrastructure assets in Australia, requires relevant entities and
operators to supply information on ownership and other matters,
and empowers the minister in charge to take action vis-a-vis such entities
and operators in case of national security risks (Australian Government,
2018a). The act is also of relevance for FDI, as national security risks are to
be assessed in case of large-scale investment proposals concerning critical
infrastructure in areas such as electricity, gas, water and ports. If such risks
are found to exist, the Treasury can deny approval.
The foreign interference act constituted a high point in Australia’s reset of
its China policy. Things did not end there, however. Although PM Turnbull
struck a conciliatory tone in a major China policy speech in August 2018—
which observers saw as a reset on the reset (e.g., McGregor, 2018)—this did
mean that the government moved away from its more robust approach.
Later in the same month, it effectively barred Chinese telecommunication
companies Huawei and ZTE from participating in the local roll-out of 5G
technology due to security concerns. This made Australia the first country to
de facto bar Chinese companies from a 5G network. By doing so, Turnbull
later explained, the government decided to hedge against ‘adverse contin-
gencies’ in case relations with China soured in the future
(Bermingham, 2019).
Despite repeated Australian attempts since mid-2018 to mend ties, rela-
tions with China have been negatively impacted by Australia’s reset. China
put high-level political exchange on hold for most of 2018. Only in late 2018
did FM Payne visit Beijing to attend a long-delayed bilateral dialogue. The
last Australian PM to visit China was Turnbull in September 2016. And in the
first half of 2019, speculation abounded that months-long delays in the han-
dling of 15 million tons of Australian thermal coal at Chinese ports were pol-
itically motivated (McGregor, 2019, p. 1) —sending the message that the
Chinese government continued to be unhappy about Canberra’s policy shift.
Comments by Morrison, on the occasion of a visit to the US in September
2019, that China should no longer be considered a developing country and
receive special treatment under World Trade Organization (WTO) rules, con-
stituted another irritant. The episode also highlighted the limits of
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bipartisanship on China policy in Australia. Rejecting Morrison’s assessment
of China’s economic status, deputy Labor leader Richard Marles accused the
government of mismanaging the ‘complex’ relationship with China, leading
to the ‘terrible’ current state of bilateral relations (Martin, 2019).
New Zealand also recalibrates its China policy
Embracing China’s rise
Successive governments in Wellington have embraced the rise of China
and the economic opportunities it has opened up for NZ. In fact, a strong
commercial orientation has coloured NZ’s relations with the PRC over the
past few decades. In the mid-1990s, signing FTAs with overseas—especially
Asian—partner countries became a foreign policy priority for Wellington
(Buchanan, 2010, p. 265). The Labour government under Helen Clark
(1999–2008) was particularly keen on making NZ the first developed coun-
try to sign a FTA with China. NZ managed to clinch the bilateral FTA in
2008, some 7 years before Australia’s own FTA with the PRC became effect-
ive. The coming into force of the FTA marked the ‘fourth first’ in bilateral
relations: in 1997, NZ became the first developed country to agree to
China’s accession to the WTO by concluding the required bilateral negotia-
tions; in 2004, it was the first developed country to recognise China as a
market economy; and, in the same year, NZ was the first developed country
to embark on FTA negotiations with the PRC. The National-led government
under PM John Key (2008–2017) continued to grow the bilateral relation-
ship. Key and his colleagues were determined to get the relationship right.
For FM Murray McCully, this even constituted a ‘top priority’ of the govern-
ment (Brady, 2018). In 2012, then trade minister Tim Groser claimed that NZ
had ‘a relationship with China that no other developed country has’
(quoted in Young, 2017a, p. 515). Notably, NZ was given the political space
to conclude—as the only Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development country to do so to date—an FTA with Taiwan (Author inter-
view, 2019f; Cook, 2013).
The relationship with China was crowned by the Strategic Partnership
Agreement in 2014. A few more ‘firsts’ followed thereafter. In 2015, NZ was
the first developed country to become a prospective founding member of
the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. In late 2016, negotia-
tions to upgrade the existing bilateral FTA were launched—constituting
another first for a developed country. Finally, in April 2017, the two coun-
tries signed a ‘Memorandum of Arrangement [MoA] on Strengthening
Cooperation on China’s Belt and Road Initiative’. Again, NZ was the first
developed country to officially support Xi’s global initiative. Unlike their col-
leagues in Canberra, who assumed a much cautious approach to the BRI
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and thus never signed on, ‘New Zealand authorities decided to be at the
table, to try to shape the Initiative in areas where it touches on New
Zealand interests, such as the Pacific’ (Young, 2017b).
Differences in Australian and NZ approaches to dealing with China were
particularly pronounced in the early years of the Key government. Whereas
Australia embarked under PM Kevin Rudd on a major modernisation of its
armed forces—trying to make the country more self-reliant in view of
China’s growing military capabilities and given lingering doubts about the
US’ long-term strategic presence in the Asia-Pacific, strategic trends that
were discussed at length in the Australian 2009 Defence White Paper
(Commonwealth of Australia, 2009)—NZ’s own 2010 Defence White Paper
mentioned major power competition in the region only in passing. The NZ
white paper also took a fairly benign view of the security implications of
China’s rise, noting that the PRC ‘both benefit[ed] from and contribute[d] to
regional stability and prosperity’ and that there was ‘a natural tendency for
it to define and pursue its interests in a more forthright way on the back of
growing wealth and power’ (New Zealand Government, 2010, p. 30).
Moreover, whereas the Rudd government revised Australia’s FDI screening
regime with a view to being better able to ward off unwanted investments
by Chinese state-owned enterprises in the Australian mining sector (see
Peters, 2019), the Key government maintained NZ’s fairly liberal FDI screen-
ing regime.
Under the Key government, NZ also differed from Australia when it came
to the SCS. Whereas the Australian government voiced its concern publicly
on a number of occasions, Wellington adopted until 2016 a low profile on
the issue and refrained from criticising Chinese behaviour. Even in closed
settings, government representatives took the position that all parties
should refrain from aggravating the situation and resolve issues peacefully
in accordance with international law (Ayson, 2016). Only when tensions
flared, with even some usually reticent Association of Southeast Asian
Nations member states becoming outspoken on the issue, did the NZ gov-
ernment change tack. Speaking in Singapore in March 2016, then FM
McCully (2016) still shied away from apportioning blame, but for the first
time mentioned ‘reclamation and construction activity and deployment of
military assets in disputed areas’ as a cause of the growing tensions. More
importantly, he voiced the expectation that all parties respected the
upcoming tribunal ruling—a position also found later in NZ’s Defence
White Paper 2016 (New Zealand Government, 2016, p. 31)—knowing that
China was very unlikely to do so. The Key government thus finally adopted
a stance on the SCS issue that was at least somewhat more in line with its
Australian ally (Capie, 2016).
Publicly, the National government also held the view that China’s
expanding profile in the South Pacific constituted no reason for concern.
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Key himself suggested that NZ’s growing trade links with China would pro-
vide Wellington with the ability to raise sensitive concerns bilaterally (Steff
& Dodd-Parr, 2019, p. 104). NZ’s China relationship was viewed
‘predominantly, if not exclusively’ (Simon Draper, quoted in Young, 2017a,
p. 525) through the trade lens. The pronounced commercial orientation of
the Key government in its approach to China showed in the ‘NZ Inc China
Strategy’, presented jointly by New Zealand Trade and Enterprise (NZTE)
and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) in 2012. It was based
on the premise that a ‘strong relationship with China is very important to
[NZ’s] prosperity’ (MFAT, n.d.). The strategy set a couple of mid-term goals,
the first of which was to ‘retain and build a strong and resilient political
relationship with China’ (NZTE & MFAT, 2012, p. 16). To help reach that
goal, a ‘no surprises policy’ (Young, 2017a, p. 515) was employed to make
sure that the government in Beijing did not get blindsided or offended by
anything coming out of Wellington. The NZ government also put strong
emphasis on growing the political relationship, which, according to Brady,
‘under National came to mean developing extensive and intimate political
links with CCP local and national leaders and their representatives and affili-
ated actors in New Zealand’ (2018).
First signs of trouble
Despite such efforts, indications mounted in 2016 that China’s more assert-
ive foreign policy behaviour also affected the ‘special relationship’ with NZ.
When Key visited Beijing in April 2016 to seek an upgrade to the bilateral
FTA, he was greeted by Xinhua and Global Times editorials stating that he
better not mention the SCS issue should he be interested in continued
flourishing trade ties. NZ’s participation in a multilateral military exercise
held partly in the SCS in April 2016 also drew the ire of the editorialists
(Capie, 2016). The editorials indicated that even in relations with a small
power, the diplomatic gloves came off in Beijing where the SCS was con-
cerned. The growing assertiveness of the Chinese government was also on
display a few months later when it threatened to retaliate against Zespri, a
major kiwi fruit exporter, if the government in Wellington chose to go
ahead with an investigation into Chinese steel dumping practices (Steff &
Dodd-Parr, 2019, p. 105).
A year later, NZ domestic politics also began to reveal problems con-
nected with the country’s close ties to China.3 Shortly before the
September 2017 general election, academic-turned-MP Yang Jian, an
important figure in NZ–China relations and a key fundraiser for National
among the Chinese community, found himself at the centre of a scandal.
Investigative journalists revealed that Yang had worked for a Chinese
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military intelligence school for a number of years and was a member of the
CCP—but had failed to mention these facts when applying for residency,
citizenship and jobs in NZ (Jennings & Reid, 2019). National defended Yang
and no formal enquiry ensued, as the new government did not pursue the
matter—perhaps because Labour also has a Chinese-born MP among its
ranks who helps the party link up with possible donors. Yang continues to
be an MP, but is no longer a member of parliament’s foreign affairs com-
mittee. The Yang affair marked the start of a public debate in NZ about the
possible interference of the CCP in domestic politics and the public sphere.
The debate has mirrored to some extent a similar one occurring in
Australia, although it has been much more low-key.
Indications of a full-scale reset in 2018
National came out of the 2017 election again as the largest parliamentary
party, but failed to secure a majority of seats. Acting as kingmaker, the
moderately populist NZ First—led by political veteran Winston Peters—
chose to join forces with Labour and its young party leader, Jacinda Ardern.
Support for the minority government from outside cabinet was provided by
the Green Party. In the new government, both the foreign affairs and the
defence portfolios went to NZ First. Peters had taken a critical stance
towards China before, especially when on the campaign trail—focusing in
particular on FDI and immigration issues. In his earlier stint as FM
(2005–2008) he had also promoted close relations with Australia, the US
and South Pacific nations. Labour, on the other hand, had in recent years
also been cautious with respect to issues such as FDI and immigration.
Major initiatives relevant to NZ’s relations with China began to unfold in
2018. In early March, Peters (2018a) unveiled the government’s ‘Pacific
Reset’ initiative. He framed it as a response to increasing competition for
influence and resources in the region. Even without directly mentioning
China, it was clear that this referred mainly to the PRC’s increasing presence
there. Certainly for Peters, there was a need to balance against this (Author
interview, 2019i). Whereas the Key government had talked about engaging
more in the South Pacific, it was the new government that made the neces-
sary funds available (Author interviews, 2019b, 2019i). The Pacific Reset
promised more technical and financial support to, and intensified engage-
ment with, Pacific partners. It entailed a significant increase in NZ’s foreign
aid and the posting of 14 more diplomats to the region, as well as a num-
ber of visits there by Peters and Ardern. The initiative also foresaw greater
policy coordination with key partners ‘near and far’ (Peters, 2018a). The lat-
ter referred not least to the US, who Peters (2018b)—in a speech delivered
later in the year—implored to step up its efforts in the South Pacific.
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He even drew a parallel to the US’ engagement in the Pacific War in 1942—
much to the surprise of the PM and Peters’ cabinet colleagues, who were
blindsided by the speech. Speaking to journalists soon after, Ardern was at
pains to emphasise that it did not mean that the government was adopting
a more pro-US stance and was less enthusiastic about China (Smellie, 2018).
The impression was that the PM and the FM were not fully on the same
page when it came to China.
Apart from the Pacific Reset, a number of other government initiatives
and statements indicated that a major reset of NZ’s approach to China was
underway. In March 2018, Peters called into doubt Wellington’s commit-
ment to supporting the BRI. He argued that it was not clear where the ini-
tiative was headed, and criticised the Key government for having been
hasty in signing up to it (Dziedzic, 2018). A few months later, the 18-month
period in which NZ and China, under the terms of the relevant MoA, should
have identified concrete BRI-related cooperation areas was notably up with-
out official follow-through.
In July 2018 the government launched its Strategic Defence Policy
Statement, which examined developments in NZ’s strategic environment and
provided policy guidance for both the Ministry of Defence and the armed
forces. The Statement argued that NZ will face ‘compounding challenges of a
scope and magnitude not previously seen in our neighbourhood’; these
included an ‘increasing importance of spheres of influence, with some states
pursuing greater influence [… ]’ (MoD, 2018, p. 6). The Statement noted that
NZ had ‘no better friend than Australia’, and that the two militaries needed
to work effectively together to address shared security interests—in particu-
lar in the South Pacific, thus linking the policy document with the Pacific
Reset. On the other hand, the Statement did not speak about China as an
‘important strategic partner’ (as the 2016 Defence White Paper had)—but
simply vowed to continue building a ‘strong and resilient’ bilateral relation-
ship (ibid., p. 14). Unlike earlier government documents, which had tended
to soft-pedal such issues, the Statement also noted China’s more assertive
approach to territories claimed in Northeast Asia and the SCS—plus its
increasing footprint in the South Pacific and Antarctica too (ibid., pp. 20, 22).
Moreover, the Statement noted that China and NZ held different views on
human rights and freedom of information (ibid., p. 17). Reflecting the
Statement’s messages on pressing military capability needs and on maintain-
ing interoperability with Australia and other security partners, the govern-
ment decided soon afterwards to invest heavily in defence equipment by
2023—inter alia by replacing NZ’s aging P-3 Orions with four state-of-the-art
Boeing P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft (Greenfield, 2018).
Of relevance to Chinese FDI in NZ has been a two-stage reform of the
Overseas Investment Act. The first stage, taking effect in October 2018,
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included a ban on foreign buyers acquiring existing homes. A new minister-
ial directive also raised the bar in terms of the ‘substantial and identifiable’
benefits that foreign investors in rural land must prove. The second stage
of the review, scheduled for legislative action in 2020, is likely to result in
more discretionary power being invested in the government to screen—
and deny, if need be—investment that is not in the ‘national interest’
(Harman, 2019b). Currently NZ lacks such screening provisions allowing the
government to assess the desirability of Chinese and other FDI projects in
critical infrastructure.
Things came to a head towards the end of 2018. In November, the
Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB), part of NZ’s intelli-
gence apparatus, blocked a bid by telecoms provider Spark due to security
concerns (GCSB, 2018). Spark had intended to use equipment from Huawei
in a first local roll-out of 5G technology. A month later, the GCSB called out
China for nefarious cyber activities. The relevant statement spoke of ‘links
between the Chinese Ministry of State Security and a global campaign of
cyber-enabled commercial intellectual property theft’ (National Cyber
Security Centre, 2018) targeting the intellectual property and commercial
data of a number of service providers, including some operating in NZ.
Whereas in the past NZ governments had been willing to name North
Korea and Russia as perpetrators of cyberattacks, they had been reluctant
to add China to that list (Ayson, 2019). Now, Wellington joined the US and
Australia in pointing the finger at China too. The minister of justice, Andrew
Little (Labour), called cyberattacks ‘a modern form of warfare’ (RNZ, 2018)
and one in which China was involved.
Pulling it all together, there it seemingly was: a full-scale reset of China
policy, giving rise to speculation that NZ was ‘shifting back to its traditional
ANZUS partners’ (Novak, 2018). What was missing, relative to Australia’s
response, was legislation concerning foreign interference. In late 2017,
when the parliament in Canberra started deliberating on the relevant bills,
Ardern argued that there was no need for such a move in NZ as there was
no evidence of similar issues at play there. Still, vigilance regarding any
overseas influence was useful, the PM added (Cheng, 2017). More than a
year later, in spring 2019, parliament’s Justice Committee notably started to
look into possible irregularities in connection with the 2016 and 2017 elec-
tions, focusing on foreign interference. In a joint statement made in the
relevant hearings, the heads of the GCSB and of the NZ Security
Intelligence Service enumerated a number of ‘vectors’ of possible foreign
interference in NZ elections. These included cyber-enabled threats, the use
of the media to spread disinformation, covert influence and leverage
(including through electoral financing), and the exertion of pressure and
control vis-a-vis diaspora communities (NZ Parliament, 2019). The jury is still
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out on whether this will lead to legislative action before the 2020 gen-
eral election.
Fence-mending: the ‘February panic’ and after
A number of things indicate that Beijing became increasingly concerned, if
not annoyed, about the direction that NZ’s China policy was taking. It
appointed a senior and outspoken diplomat, Madam Wu Xi, as the new
ambassador to Wellington in spring 2018 (Author interview, 2019f). A few
months later, it called in the NZ ambassador to the PRC to complain about
the depictions of Chinese behaviour in the Strategic Defence Policy
Statement (Sachdeva, 2018). Also, noises were made to NZ businesses oper-
ating in China to relate any concerns back to the government in Wellington
(Author interview, 2019f). Finally, Ardern’s first official visit to China got
delayed by ‘scheduling difficulties’. More often than not, such issues either
indicate diverging priorities on both sides or, worse, clouded relations.
By February 2019, Ardern had still not visited China, and the desired
updated FTA seemed to be on the backburner in Beijing. Talk of Chinese
‘political blowback’ to the shift in NZ’s China policy mounted in the local
media. Pundits suggested that the PM was being played by Peters and his
NZ First colleagues on foreign and security policy (Smellie, 2019). The
opposition also chipped in, blaming the government for a steadily deterio-
rating relationship with the PRC. Unlike in Australia, there was no bipartisan
support for a more substantial change in the country’s China policy, which
became more of a ‘political football’ (Author interview, 2019d). A few other
circumstances contributed to the ‘February panic’, media-hyped as it was
(Author interview, 2019a): the sudden postponement of the 2019 China–NZ
Year of Tourism’s launch; reports about Chinese tourists being discouraged
from visiting; and, the turning away in mid-air of an Air New Zealand plane
bound for Shanghai (Edwards, 2019). In sum, things seemed to have spi-
ralled out of control, with the government—and the PM in particular—
coming under increasing pressure to do something about it in order to
avoid major economic damage.
And that is what the NZ government did, with a little help from its
Chinese counterpart—which seemingly also had little interest in ties with
yet another country hitting rock bottom (Author interview, 2019f). From
late February onwards, things were in recovery mode—with conciliatory
statements from both foreign ministries and the Chinese embassy in NZ,
the tourism year finally getting underway and Ardern finally visiting Beijing
in April 2019. Unlike senior members of the Turnbull government in
Australia, but like her predecessor Key, Ardern had very much shied away
from any direct criticism of China (Author interviews, 2019f, 2019j;
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McGregor, 2019, p. 2). In Beijing, she assured Xi that China was a ‘valued
partner’ and that its companies would not be discriminated against in NZ.
Speaking to journalists about the tensions in the SCS, she said that all terri-
torial issues in the region should be resolved peacefully and in accordance
with international law, essentially going back to the old McCully position.
She thus stayed clear from the kind of accusations levelled explicitly or
implicitly at China in the 2018 Defence Statement and in Peters’ speeches.
In a media briefing, Ardern emphasised that NZ did not pick sides but pur-
sued a ‘principled approach that is not about the relative position of any
other nation regardless of whether they are partners or allies but simply
[about] maintaining a position that responds to NZ’s interests and inde-
pendence’ (Harman, 2019a). This was a far cry from the more hawkish and
pro-US line pursued by her NZ First cabinet colleagues.
Soon after Ardern’s visit, the minister for trade and export growth, David
Parker, attended the second BRI Forum in Beijing in April 2019—bringing
back ideas about selective NZ involvement in areas such as streamlining
custom procedures, behind-the-border services and ‘greening’ the initiative
(Author interviews, 2019d, 2019h; TVNZ, 2019). Peters himself went on
record to endorse the government’s stance on BRI collaboration, ostensibly
because it had now become clearer that the initiative went beyond mere
infrastructure (Walls, 2019). Finally in May 2019, Ardern asserted in an inter-
view that she was in charge of NZ’s foreign policy direction—and thus also
towards China (Harman, 2019d).
With Ardern’s taking charge of China policy in 2019, NZ’s seemingly
clear-cut reset of relations lost some of its sharper edges. This recalibration
did not, however, amount to a full-fledged reversal of policy. After all,
important decisions and initiatives taken in 2018 such as the Pacific Reset,
hefty investment in new surveillance planes, the new investment regime
and the decision on Huawei were not overturned. Emphasising the inde-
pendence of NZ’s foreign policy, Ardern made clear that the government
would not simply fall in line with US or Australian positions but rather
make its own assessments. Selective participation in the BRI is a case in
point here. Ardern’s diplomatically adroit state visit to Beijing helped to re-
stabilise ties with China and to ‘put a floor under the relationship’, as a
senior NZ diplomat put it (Author interview, 2019d). Certainly, Ardern’s visit
was well received in China. An editorial in the Mandarin-language version
of Global Times, published shortly after, drew a clear line between Canberra
and Wellington. Whereas Australia harboured ‘greater geopolitical ambi-
tions’ in the shadow of the US and needed to be pressured, the more prag-
matic NZ, which placed ‘greater emphasis on its economic interests’,
needed to be understood and worked with, it said (Harman, 2019c). This
somewhat clumsy attempt to drive a wedge between the two Australasian
THE PACIFIC REVIEW 423
allies could have come out of the UFWD’s playbook, and was readily per-
ceived as such (Author interview, 2019a).
Despite the reassuring noises coming out of Beijing, ‘the gloss has gone’
in NZ–China relations, as one close observer put it (Author interview,
2019b). The future of the bilateral relationship is bound to be bumpier.
Difficult decisions loom ahead. For example, Huawei’s participation in roll-
ing out 5G might require another look—and possibly a political decision—
if Spark decides to come up with a modified 5G proposal. As McGregor
notes, ‘Beijing remains hopeful that NZ will, in some form, accept Huawei
into its 5G network. Not only would that be a win for Huawei, it would also
isolate Australia’ (2019, p. 8). A final decision on Huawei could easily be per-
ceived as a proxy for where the NZ government stands in the confrontation
between the US and China. Also, Beijing will keep a close watch on how
Chinese investment projects are henceforth treated under a beefed-up
Overseas Investment Act—and indeed on what comes out of the NZ parlia-
ment’s inquiry into election irregularities. There will also be other issues on
which the governments in Wellington and Beijing do not see eye to eye,
especially given the evolution of China’s domestic and foreign policies
under Xi. In any case, the kind of ‘monocular approach to China (as if that
country was a large marketplace and little else)’ (Ayson, 2012, p. 356) that
prevailed under the Key government has given way to more sober assess-
ments of the opportunities but also risks that close ties with China entail
(authors interviews 2019a, 2019b, 2019d, 2019f).
Conclusion: comparing Australian and NZ recalibrations of
China policy
In the preceding two sections, I took stock of Australia’s and NZ’s recent
recalibrations of China policy. Table 1 summarises the relevant similarities
and differences across time in a number of domains. Australian and NZ
approaches to managing relations with China have diverged for some time
now. This became especially pronounced when Australian state actors
embarked on a major reset of China policy in the face of growing concerns
over the PRC’s assertive behaviour in the SCS and its increasing footprint in
the South Pacific, as well as after instances of Chinese meddling in domestic
politics and the public sphere in Australia. The reset culminated in legisla-
tion on foreign interference in mid-2018, with then PM Turnbull criticising
China by name. The Australian government was also the first to effectively
bar Chinese companies from the domestic roll-out of 5G, and has engaged
externally in strategic balancing behaviour—most notably in the South
Pacific. Attempts to mend the frayed bilateral ties notwithstanding, the gov-
ernment in Canberra has under Turnbull and Morrison—who both built on
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Table 1. Dimensions of China Policy in Australia and New Zealand 2016–2019
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Rudd’s earlier moves—recalibrated its approach to dealing with China in a
fairly consistent and straightforward manner, leading to an altogether more
robust and confrontational stance. Willingness to engage in a trade war
apart, Australia’s approach has been fairly in sync with that of its
American ally.
The NZ case is more complex, as that government’s management of rela-
tions with China has shifted more often over time. The Key government
viewed China predominantly through a commercial lens, and, unlike Australia,
embraced early on various Chinese initiatives connected to the country’s rise
such as the BRI. It refrained from publicly criticising China, and only became
slightly more outspoken on the SCS issue as late as 2016. NZ’s supposedly spe-
cial relationship with China immediately began to show strains.
The change in government in late 2017 brought about a multidimen-
sional recalibration of China policy. This echoed in many ways Australia’s
own reset. However, NZ’s adjustment of China policy has been less straight-
forward, more contested and overall more ambiguous. To some degree at
least, the seeming inconsistency in the Ardern government’s approach to
dealing with China reflected different viewpoints within the ruling coalition.
Whereas the junior coalition partner NZ First, led by Peters, sought to bring
NZ in close alignment with Australia and the US over China, Ardern, PM
and leader of the Labour party, refrained from criticising China over the SCS
or other issues and repeatedly emphasised the independence of NZ’s for-
eign policy. In the face of mounting domestic concerns over worsening
bilateral relations she effectively took charge of China policy in spring 2019,
seeking to stabilise bilateral ties and to ward off possible economic dam-
age. Unlike Australia, NZ continued to engage with the BRI and did not
close off all options with respect to Huawei’s 5G participation. The jury is
still out on whether there will be comprehensive non-interference legisla-
tion, Australian-style, in NZ, or, more likely, some tinkering with party-
funding regulations. Still, the significant recalibration of China policy taking
place in NZ from 2018 has led, on some counts at least, to greater conver-
gence with Australia. Whereas, metaphorically speaking, the two
Australasian partners still do not always sing the same hymns when it
comes to China, they at least have come to use the same hymn book more
often under the Ardern government.
Why NZ’s management of China relations (still) differs
from Australia’s
Australia and NZ are closely linked and share many commonalities. Yet, NZ’s
management of its asymmetric relationship with the PRC has diverged from
Australia’s for some time now. Even after NZ’s recalibration of China policy in
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2018, there has been no full convergence. How can we account for this in the-
oretical terms? And, how do government representatives and close observers
in NZ explain the difference in approaches?
Young has argued in this journal that NZ’s response to the rise of China
in recent decades has not solely been driven by material economic interest
but also by ‘a search for ontological security as a small trading nation’
(2017a, p. 526). He shows how two of the factors that distinguish NZ from
Australia, viz. small power status and the importance of trade, became
enmeshed in terms of NZ policymakers’ collective identity frames. He uses
this constructivist approach to explain why and how NZ managed its China
relationship for a long time differently from Australia. Yet, such a focus on
collective identity frames cannot account for the occurrence of greater
China policy convergence across the Tasman Sea in 2018. Nor for that mat-
ter does it fully explain why the NZ government modified its approach only
later on.
A useful starting point for understanding why NZ’s China policy has not
fully converged with Australia’s—and, as I would argue, is also unlikely to
do so in the foreseeable future—is NZ’s status as a small power. In fact, sev-
eral of my interviewees made direct reference to this status and how it
affects the country’s approach to dealing with China. A Wellington-based
China specialist argued that small countries needed to be more pragmatic
than bigger ones (Author interview, 2019c). A senior foundation official sug-
gested that ‘Australians feel that they have agency. That they can change, if
not China, then at least the [international] environment in which China
operates’; NZ, on the other hand, was an ‘environment-taker’ (Author inter-
view, 2019h). A senior intelligence official, noted in a similar vein that NZ
was a ‘taker of global security’, adding that ‘[w]hen you are a small power,
you cannot go around throwing your weight around. We have a different
value proposition. Countries have to pick their battles.’ He also noted that
Australia and NZ had ‘fundamentally different tools at their disposal.
Australia is more publicly vocal. That is not the way it works in New
Zealand’ (Author interview, 2019j). A senior NZ-based Australian diplomat
concurred, saying that conflicts were addressed and resolved in different
ways by the two countries—with the Australian approach being ‘more bru-
tal and open’ (Author interview, 2019g).
Theoretical perspectives and implications
Both asymmetry theory and small-power theorising help to explain NZ’s
overall more prudent, restrained and more risk-averse approach to handling
its relationship with China. The great power disparity in the China–NZ dyad
puts a particular premium on careful relationship management.
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NZ’s elasticity of exports to China increase the country’s vulnerability to
potential economic coercion or retaliation by the PRC. This all requires NZ
governments to walk a diplomatic tightrope in their relationship with
China. Asymmetry theory however also posits that the stronger side is not
able dictate the terms of the relationship to the weaker one. The recalibra-
tion of NZ’s China policy in 2018 serves as a case in point here, whereas the
subsequent modification of the course of action can be read as a return to
greater prudence and greater risk-averseness—without, however, diluting
the essence of the earlier recalibration. The apparent modification of the
approach taken—publicly reassuring China that it is a valued partner and
that its companies will not be discriminated against; returning to more neu-
tral language concerning the SCS issue; and, reconfirming engagement
with China’s signature foreign policy and connectivity project, the BRI—can
even be interpreted as an instance of learning and rapid adaptation on the
part of a small power. In sum, while small-power status does indeed influ-
ence such states’ behaviour, it does not ultimately determine it. Choices
and thus agency on the part of small powers matter.
How such choices and learning come about is, however, something that
small-power theories and asymmetry theory are ill-equipped to answer on
their own. This is where case-sensitive knowledge comes into play. For one,
such theories need to be complemented by a focus on the strategic out-
look of the policymakers in the case(s) concerned. Strategic outlooks are
shaped by factors that reflect the particularities of the case in question. The
strategic outlook of NZ policymakers is arguably shaped by perceptions of
the smallness and international status of the country, the tantamount
importance accorded to trade (promotion) and by security ties with
Australia—NZ’s only formal alliance partner—and to a lesser degree with
the US. In theoretical terms, a military alliance with another big power
can—depending on the circumstances—enable or constrain the manage-
ment of a particular asymmetric relationship. In times of conflictual or con-
frontational relations between two big powers, a small power’s
management of the asymmetric relationship and of the alliance in question
can become deeply entangled, adding another layer of analytic complexity.
For small powers such a situation can lead to difficult choices, ones which
they would prefer to avoid. Of course, such reasoning may well also apply
to middle powers such as Australia. In any case, the absence/existence of
an alliance with another big power can impact the management
of asymmetric relations with a big power. This also helps to explain why
NZ’s management of relations with China is bound to differ to some degree
from Australia’s—which, for better or worse, is tied by alliance to the US.
Small-power theories also need to factor in what Womack calls ‘domestic
complications’ (2016, p. 208)—meaning domestic constraints on state
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action, which are particularly important in democracies. Such complications
or constraints can take the form of public opinion and media discourse.
Also, the party or parties of the opposition can influence public policies
through vetoes in the legislature or, more simply, public criticism of the
government. In any case, the ‘local ground of confrontation’ often compli-
cates government choices on appropriate action in asymmetric relation-
ships (Womack, 2016, pp. 208–209). As the recalibration of China policy
under the Ardern government shows, the composition of government coali-
tions can be another such domestic complication. When the perspectives
and positions of the parties forming a coalition government—and, of
course, also those of actors within a governing party—are not fully congru-
ent with respect to handling an asymmetric relationship, this can render
the management of it more ambiguous and inconsistent.
Suggestions for further research
Probing deeper into Australia’s and NZ’s recalibrations of China policy
would require opening the black boxes of relevant policy formation in the
two countries. John Kingdon’s ‘multiple streams’ approach could serve as a
starting point to analyse the making of Australia’s reset and of the more
ambiguous evolution of NZ’s China policy under the Ardern government.
As Karin Guldbrandsson and Bj€o€orn Fossum note (2009), building on
Kingdon’s (1984) seminal work, ‘[a] policy window may open when simul-
taneously a problem is recognized, a policy is available and the political
context is positive for change’ (2009, p. 438)—in other words, when, in
Kingdon’s terms, the ‘problem stream’, the ‘policy stream’ and the ‘politics
stream’ converge. Applying this to the Australasian recalibrations of China
policy would require close analysis of the relevant problem streams (local
perceptions of China’s growing assertiveness and of interference issues),
policy streams (policy ideas on how best to deal with these problems, and
the roles played by carriers of such ideas, namely policy entrepreneurs) and
politics streams (political events and developments affecting the willingness
of policymakers to address relevant problems, such as the advent of a new
government or changes in public opinion)—and, further, how these
streams converge. To capture the effects of coalition government dynamics
in the NZ case—and, though less important, of the cabinet change from
Turnbull to Morrison in the Australian one—on the subsequent develop-
ment of policy one could move from the original ‘three streams’ model to a
‘four streams’ one—or even to a more complex model of policy processes
(see Howlett, McConnell, & Perl, 2015, pp. 7–10).
Further research could also seek to trace how the diffusion of ideas, narra-
tives and policy templates across the Tasman has contributed to the partial
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convergence of Australia and NZ in areas such as engagement in the South
Pacific, responses to cyberattacks or the development of 5G policy. Relevant
processes of diffusion could be based on mechanisms such as coercion, or a
combination of coercion and normative pressure (exerted through political or
diplomatic channels), emulation/imitation (voluntary adoption and possible
adaption of policy templates), or learning and coordination on the basis of
shared intelligence and the like (cf. Berry & Berry, 2014, pp. 310–313). It would
be interesting to see whether a particular mechanism was dominant, or
whether rather a mix thereof—reflecting the different issue areas—was
involved in trans-Tasman diffusion processes regarding China policy (and also
whether diffusion was only a one-way street).
A final research desideratum concerns the respective economic vulner-
ability of Australia and NZ vis-a-vis China. While claims concerning such vul-
nerability abound, empirical and model-based research on the subject
matter has only just begun (Giesecke, Tran, & Waschik, 2019; Medcalf, 2017;
Steff & Dodd-Parr, 2019, pp.100–101).4 Further research along these lines
should thus be pursued to validate the veracity of such claims, and their
policy implications.
NOTES
1. There are no set definitions of ‘small powers’ and ‘middle powers’. However, as
Thorhallsson and Steinsson (2017, p. 3) note, often states with a population size under
10–15 million people are considered small. The current population of NZ is close to five
million. Australia, with its around 25 million people, is thus five times larger, and in
2018 its economy was nearly seven times larger than NZ’s. In 2018/19 Australia spent,
according to data gathered by Jane’s Defence Weekly, more than nine times as much on
defence as NZ.
2. This section draws on K€ollner (2018, pp. 3–8). For accounts of the reset, see also
McGregor (2019, pp. 2–4) and Medcalf (2019, pp. 113–115).
3. The following paragraphs draw on K€ollner (2019, pp. 4–8).
4. For recent discussions of Australia’s dependence on China, see the October 2019 edition
of Australian Foreign Affairs.
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